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INTRODUCTION 
Analyzing conflicts of laws requires thinking both about the scope of 
potentially applicable law and about priority, or choice, among potentially 
applicable laws. The “scope” question asks whether a particular law applies 
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to the relevant transaction or event. It encompasses considerations of both 
substantive coverage (e.g., whether the law is intended to apply to all traffic 
accidents, or only those caused by motorized vehicles) and spatial coverage 
(e.g., whether the law is intended to apply to all traffic accidents, or only 
those occurring within the enacting state). The “priority” question asks 
which among competing laws should be applied. The relationship between 
scope and priority is central to theoretical and methodological concerns in 
the conflicts field, such as the nature of unilateralism versus multilateralism.1 
It is also central to intensely practical concerns, such as the function and 
limitations of contractual governing-law clauses.2 The Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws3 (“Restatement Second”), however, contains little 
guidance on how, or in what order, courts are to address these two inquiries. 
For the most part, it simply treats considerations of scope as one relevant 
factor in choice-of-law analysis.4 
The draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws5 (“Restatement 
Third,” or the “draft”), in contrast, differentiates clearly the respective roles 
of these two analytical elements. It characterizes the resolution of a choice-
of-law question as a two-step process: 
First, it must be decided which states’ laws are relevant, in that they might 
be used as a rule of decision. This is typically a matter of discerning the 
scope of the various states’ internal laws: deciding to which people, in 
which places, under which circumstances, they extend rights or 
obligations. Second, if state internal laws conflict, it must be decided 
which law shall be given priority.6 
 
 1.  See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 366 (2006): 
One of the sub-questions in the [choice-of-law] process is whether the choice of law should be 
based: (a) on the respective “claims” of each involved state to apply its law; or (b) on predefined 
neutral criteria that are indifferent to these claims. The first option is the basis of unilateralism, 
whereas the second is the basis of multilateralism. 
 2.  See infra Part II. 
 3.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1971) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT SECOND]. 
 4.  RESTATEMENT SECOND § 6 (outlining choice of law principles and asking courts to consider 
the relevant policies of both the forum and any other interested state, thereby inviting consideration of 
the scope of potentially applicable law). 
 5.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. Council Draft No. 1, Nov. 
11, 2016) [hereinafter Council Draft]. 
 6.  Id. § 5.01 cmt. b. The Restatement Third aims primarily to develop more precise rules 
governing choice of law in various substantive areas, in the expectation that courts will generally be able 
to apply those rules “without any explicit consideration of scope or priority.” Id. at Introduction to Chapter 
Five, at 111 (emphasis added) (stating that “the rules are intended to stand on their own”). As the reporters 
explain, however, the rules “have been derived through the two-step process . . . , by positing the likely 
scope of state laws in light of their likely or generally accepted purposes and then attempting to determine 
the most appropriate law . . .” Id. § 5.02 cmt. c. 
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The first step—the scope analysis—is operationalized in two particular 
sections. Section 1.03(1) defines the “internal law” of a state to include 
“restrictions the law places on the persons who may assert rights under the 
law or the geographic scope of the law.”7 This definition explicitly 
distinguishes such scope restrictions from choice-of-law rules, which are 
excluded from the definition of “internal law.”8 Section 5.02 instructs a court 
not to apply a statute—of either its own state or a foreign state—if the 
transaction or event being litigated “falls outside the specified scope” of that 
statute.9 In sum, this approach means that conflicts problems may be 
resolved solely on the basis of scope considerations, as courts both within 
and outside the enacting state must defer to that state’s conclusion as to the 
scope of its own law. 
Some laws include an explicit provision addressing their own reach; 
most, however, do not.10 This raises two questions that the current draft does 
not answer clearly. First, is the definition of internal law meant to include 
only express restrictions on scope? It does not appear to be so limited. 
Although some passages of the draft instruct courts to effectuate “express” 
or “specific” statements of scope as part of a state’s internal law,11 in general, 
the draft seems to contemplate that courts of other states must follow any 
authoritative determination by the enacting state of a law’s scope, including 
a judicial determination.12 In other words, the draft at least sometimes views 
implied restrictions on scope as part of a state’s internal law as well. 
Second, absent explicit restrictions, how is the scope of a law to be 
determined? Overall, the draft takes the approach that “the scope of forum 
internal law is a question of forum law. It is determined by the same sources 
that are used for ordinary questions of legal interpretation.”13 This approach 
 
 7.  Id. § 1.03 cmt. a. 
 8.  Id. § 1.03(1). 
 9.  Id. § 5.02 cmt. b. The comments suggest further that the application by a state court of another 
state’s statute to a set of facts “outside its specified scope” would constitute a violation of the full faith 
and credit clause. Id. § 5.02 Reporters’ Notes, cmt. b on subsection (1). 
 10.  Such a provision can take the form of either a limitation (e.g., “this law shall apply only to 
conduct occurring within this State”) or an expansion (e.g., “this law shall apply to all conduct, whether 
occurring within or outside this State, involving a citizen of this State”). 
 11.  On that point the draft characterizes its approach as reflecting current practice, stating that 
“courts generally do treat explicit limits on the scope of other states’ statutes as binding.” Id. § 1.03 cmt. 
b. In Reporters’ Notes to that comment as well as to comment b of Section 5.02, however, the draft cites 
only three cases, all relating to Pennsylvania law, and only as “suggesting” that statutory specifications 
of scope in foreign statutes are binding. 
 12.  Id. § 5.01 cmt. c and associated illustrations; see also id. § 5.08 cmt. b (“Ordinarily, the [forum] 
court should aim to determine foreign law in light of how it is authoritatively interpreted and applied in 
the foreign state. This ordinarily requires consideration not only of the text of the foreign law itself, but 
also foreign court opinions, secondary sources . . . .”). 
 13.  Id. § 5.01 cmt. c. 
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incorporates Brainerd Currie’s insight that determining whether or not a law 
applies in a multistate case can be viewed as a question of ordinary legal 
interpretation, drawing on the same tools courts use to construe the meaning 
and applicability of law in a purely domestic setting.14 Beyond this, the draft 
provides no specific guidance on the methods that courts should use to 
ascertain the scope of law when legislative intent is unclear. In particular, it 
does not address the role of the presumption against extraterritoriality, a 
canon of construction that courts frequently use in interpreting questions of 
scope.15 
This article advocates for additional guidance regarding determinations 
of scope for two important reasons. First, and in my view most critically, 
courts addressing such restrictions must differentiate between interstate and 
international conflicts.16 The legal framework within which the presumption 
against extraterritoriality operates is very different in those two contexts, a 
fact not always acknowledged or reflected in the jurisprudence. Second, 
current judicial treatment of implied restrictions on scope in analyzing 
conflicts is not uniform, and will need to be addressed in forthcoming 
substantive provisions (particularly those addressing contract law). 
Part I of this article analyzes the role of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in supplying implied restrictions on the scope of law. It 
considers the role of the presumption in both international and interstate 
conflicts of laws, focusing on the rationales supporting its application in the 
different contexts. Part I concludes with a comparison of the international 
law and constitutional law frameworks within which the presumption 
operates in those respective settings. Part II examines current judicial 
practice regarding the analysis of scope and priority in resolving conflicts of 
laws. It begins by outlining the relevant provisions of the Restatement 
 
 14.  See id. at 111 (explicitly adopting Currie’s approach on this particular point); see also Brainerd 
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178 (1959) (“This 
process is essentially the familiar one of construction or interpretation. Just as we determine by that 
process how a statute applies in time, and how it applies to marginal domestic situations, so we may 
determine how it should be applied to cases involving foreign elements in order to effectuate the 
legislative purpose.”). For critiques of this view, see generally, for example, Lea Brilmayer, Interest 
Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980) and Friedrich K. Juenger, 
Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1984). 
 15.  Compare the RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (AM. LAW INST. 
Preliminary Draft No. 4, Aug. 17, 2016), which addresses this topic at Section 203 and in associated notes 
and comments. The projected table of contents for the complete Restatement Third includes a section on 
“extraterritorial legislation.” It is grouped with other constitutional doctrines relating to the allocation of 
authority between states and the federal government, and does not appear to cover the interpretation of 
state law in cases of conflict. 
 16.  The general position of the draft is that “[f]or the purposes of conflict of laws, the interstate and 
international contexts are broadly similar,” and so it does not generally distinguish between the two types 
of conflict. Council Draft, supra note 5, § 1.04 cmt. c. 
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Second, and then turns to the distinction between explicit and implicit 
restrictions on scope. It analyzes that distinction through the lens of a 
common problem: a contract dispute involving a transaction or event that 
falls outside the scope of the law chosen by the parties to govern their 
agreement. 
I. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
This Part begins with a brief introduction outlining the history of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. It then turns to its subsequent 
evolution, considering its application in the interpretation of both federal and 
state law. This Part’s main purpose is to clarify the distinction between the 
extraterritorial application of state law in international conflicts, on the one 
hand, and in interstate conflicts, on the other. It analyzes judicial 
implementation of the presumption against extraterritoriality in each case, 
focusing on the theoretical justifications courts offer for employing the 
presumption. 
A. Introduction 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a judicially created 
doctrine of statutory interpretation, designed to guide courts in ascertaining 
the geographic scope of federal legislation. In one leading case, the Supreme 
Court summarized the doctrine as follows: “legislation of Congress, unless 
a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.”17 It has been applied in cases dating to the 
early nineteenth century, although not always consistently—the Supreme 
Court, for instance, has applied it in many but not all of its decisions in the 
area of legislative jurisdiction.18 
The presumption emerged at a time when laws were understood to have 
no force beyond the territorial borders of the enacting state. Early cases 
employing the presumption explicitly connected the process of construing 
congressional intent with that understanding. For instance, in The Appollon, 
an 1824 case addressing the reach of U.S. customs law, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except 
so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the 
 
 17.  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 
15, § 203 (“U.S. courts interpret federal statutory provisions to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States unless there is a clear indication of congressional intent to the contrary.”). 
 18.  See generally William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 
16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998) (outlining the application and purpose of the presumption). 
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sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction. And, 
however general and comprehensive the phrases used in our municipal 
laws may be, they must always be restricted in construction, to places and 
persons, upon whom the Legislature have authority and jurisdiction . . . 
[I]t would be an unjust interpretation of our laws, to give them a meaning 
[at] variance with the independence and sovereignty of foreign nations.19 
Because the classic presumption against extraterritoriality applies only 
to federal legislation, it has no direct application to state statutes. However, 
the strict understanding of territorial sovereignty in which the presumption 
was rooted applied equally to state law. And indeed, as in the federal context, 
early cases interpreting state law connected the process of statutory 
interpretation with that understanding. In one case decided in 1916, for 
instance, the Supreme Court of California, in language mirroring that of the 
decision in The Appollon, reasoned as follows: 
Ordinarily, the statutes of a state have no force beyond its boundaries. 
Except within the domain committed to the control of the federal 
government, the states of the Union are “severally sovereign, independent 
and foreign to each other in regard to their internal and domestic affairs.” 
Although a state may have the power to legislate concerning the rights and 
obligations of its citizens with regard to transactions occurring beyond its 
boundaries, the presumption is that it did not intend to give its statutes any 
extraterritorial effect.20 
It is important to highlight that this particular justification for the 
presumption against extraterritoriality operates identically not only with 
respect to federal and state law, but also with respect to international and 
interstate conflicts. If state law has force only within the territory of the 
enacting state, then its application anywhere else, whether a sister state or a 
foreign country, is foreclosed. Thus, courts applying the presumption on this 
basis would have no need to distinguish between those two forms of conflict. 
Over time, the strictly territorial understanding of sovereignty faded. At 
the federal level, forms of legislative jurisdiction—most prominently, 
effects-based jurisdiction—gained acceptance that permitted the application 
of one nation’s law to conduct occurring outside its territorial boundaries 
(even in cases involving non-citizens).21 This shift did not mean the end of 
 
 19.  The Appollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824); see also Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 
347, 357 (1909) (following this reasoning in a case involving the conduct of a U.S. company, and stating 
that federal statutes should be construed as applicable only within “the territorial limits over which the 
lawmaker has general and legitimate power”—i.e., construed to reach only conduct within the United 
States). 
 20.  N. Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 4 (Cal. 1916). 
 21.  The watershed case on this point is United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 
(2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa), in which the Second Circuit, sitting for the Supreme Court, announced that “any 
state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders 
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.” The perception that customary 
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the presumption against extraterritoriality—merely that the Supreme Court 
turned to alternative justifications in applying it.22 The most prominent 
justification in the case law is international comity, or the desire to “avoid 
the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct 
in foreign countries.”23 Several cases also offer a separation-of-powers 
explanation for the presumption, noting the “danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy” inherent in the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law.24 Finally, many cases have emphasized the 
perception that “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not 
foreign matters,”25 characterizing the presumption as a way to approximate 
congressional intent.26 
A similar change occurred with respect to state law. In particular, the 
“vested rights” theory of choice of law,27 based on strict territoriality, gave 
way to new conflicts theories. These theories focused on the presence of 
contacts between particular transactions or events and the forum, and on the 
interest of the forum state in regulating those transactions or events.28 Under 
these new theories, state law could reach conduct occurring outside the 
 
international law on jurisdiction continues to impose some limits on the application of domestic law to 
cross-border situations anchors continuing commitment to the Charming Betsy doctrine. 
 22.  See generally Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire: International Law and Statutory 
Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 533 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William 
S. Dodge eds., 2011) (discussing the canon’s loss of its “legal foundation in international law,” and 
resulting consequences for its interpretation and application). Id. at 540. 
 23.  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016); see also McCulloch v. 
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. 
 24.  See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013). For a discussion 
of this justification, see Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 
37 VA. J. INT’L L. 506, 550–61 (1997). 
 25.  RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007) (“United States law governs domestically but 
does not rule the world . . . .”). 
 26.  In several recent cases, the Court has stated that the presumption will be applied regardless of 
the likelihood of actual conflict with foreign laws, placing increasing emphasis on this final justification 
for the presumption. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (while 
recognizing the “probability of incompatibility [between U.S. securities laws and] the applicable laws of 
other countries”); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993) (noting that “the 
presumption has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the laws of other nations”). 
 27.  See generally LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
18–20 (1991) (describing vested rights theory and its dependence on strict territorial limits of law). 
 28.  See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. 
CT. REV. 179, 209 (1991) (“Territoriality was abandoned and the theory of ‘interests’ emerged—not 
Brainerd Currie’s governmental interest analysis, which came later and built on these earlier 
developments, but the idea that a state may exercise authority over persons or acts that impinge on its 
sphere of legitimate concern.”). 
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borders of the enacting state.29 As with respect to federal law, courts did not 
abandon the presumption against extraterritoriality, but simply turned to 
alternative explanations for its use. Here, though, a critical difference 
emerges: Unlike strict territorialism, the additional justifications for applying 
the presumption do not operate identically with respect to international and 
interstate conflicts. The following section analyzes current practice in these 
two settings. 
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of State Law in 
International Conflicts 
The application of state law in international cases creates the potential 
for conflict between that law and the law of a foreign nation. In two critical 
respects, such cases present the same problems as the application of federal 
law in international cases. First, they create the possibility of international 
discord. Second, due to foreign affairs concerns, they create a potential 
problem regarding the allocation of power within the U.S. political system 
(although, as we will see, of a slightly different nature than in the federal 
context). Many courts applying a presumption against the application of state 
law in international cases acknowledge the difference between interpretation 
of federal and state legislation, but recognize these similarities.30 In 
addressing the need to avoid friction with foreign sovereigns, for instance, 
courts invoke international comity as a reason for the presumption. In an age 
discrimination claim brought under Pennsylvania human rights law, for 
example, a federal district court stated: 
[F]ederal courts will only attribute to Congress an intent to apply federal 
law outside the United States when Congress has very explicitly expressed 
such an intention. The rationale for this reluctance—respect for the 
sovereignty of other nations within their territories—should make courts 
even more reluctant to apply state law outside the boundaries of the United 
States.31 
 
 29.  For excellent analysis of these developments, see generally Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, 
Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992) and 
Kramer, supra note 28. 
 30.  This is not true of all cases. Some courts seem simply to assume the existence of a presumption 
against applying state law in international cases, without offering a rationale. See, e.g., Taylor v. E. 
Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 414 n.9 (Mass. 2013). Others recite the “well-established 
presumption” against extraterritorial application of state law in general (often drawing on the 
territorialism justification), and then apply it in the international context without noting the special 
concerns raised in international cases. See, e.g., Judkins v. Saint Joseph’s Coll. of Maine, 483 F. Supp. 
2d 60, 65 (D. Me. 2007); Archut v. Ross Univ. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 2012 WL 5867148, at *12 (D. 
N.J. 2012) (quoting cases that had presumed New Jersey anti-discrimination law to apply only to conduct 
within that state, and concluding that conduct occurring in foreign countries would likewise be “beyond 
the reach of the statute.” Id. at 12). 
 31.  Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879, 886 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
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With respect to the allocation of authority to address matters of foreign 
relations, where the federal cases focus on separation of powers between the 
political branches and the judiciary, the state cases focus on the division of 
power between state and federal lawmakers. The Supreme Court has held 
that, as a general matter, the sovereign authority of U.S. states to regulate 
extraterritorially is analogous to that of the federal government.32 However, 
several constitutional doctrines limit the role of the states in matters of 
foreign affairs. Courts often invoke these limitations in justifying a 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of state law in 
international cases. In one representative case, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered the application of state tort law in an international case.33 
It noted that the classic presumption against extraterritoriality applies only 
to federal legislation, and reasoned that “given that the Constitution entrusts 
foreign affairs to the federal political branches, limits state power over 
foreign affairs, and establishes the supremacy of federal enactments over 
state law, the presumption against extraterritorial application is even stronger 
in the context of state tort law.”34 Other cases have similarly invoked the 
limited role of states in matters of foreign affairs.35 
For similar reasons, courts addressing the applicability of state 
regulatory law in international cases often decide that the geographic scope 
of those laws is coterminous with the geographic scope of their federal 
counterparts. In one case, a court considered the geographic scope of the 
Donnelly Act, New York’s antitrust statute.36 The court concluded: 
It is not necessary to know precisely the extent of the Donnelly Act’s 
extraterritorial reach to understand that it cannot reach foreign conduct 
deliberately placed by Congress beyond the Sherman Act’s jurisdiction. 
The federal limitation upon the reach of the Sherman Act, predicated upon 
and an expression of the essentially federal power to regulate foreign 
commerce, would be undone if states remained free to authorize “little 
Sherman Act” claims that went beyond it. The established presumption is, 
of course, against the extraterritorial operation of New York law, and we 
do not see how it could be overcome in a situation where the analogue 
federal claim would be barred by congressional enactment.37 
 
 32.  Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 78–79 (1941). 
 33.  Al Shimari v. CACI Intern., Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 34.  Id. at 231 (citations omitted). 
 35.  See, e.g., Doricent v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1993 WL 437670, at *8 (D. Mass. 1993) (noting that 
“although federal laws sometimes have extraterritorial reach, this feature has been attributed to 
Congress’s constitutional powers to conduct affairs with foreign nations”). 
 36.  See Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Equitas, 969 N.E.2d 187 (N.Y. 2012). 
 37.  Id. at 195 (citation omitted); see also Hammell v. Banque Paribas, 780 F. Supp. 196, 200 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (in a case concerning state anti-discrimination law, concluding that “since both the 
[Aramco] decision and the case at bar concern the applicability of United States law abroad, an area 
within the special competence of the federal government, the Court believes it should defer to the 
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C. The Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of State Law in 
Interstate Conflicts 
The application of state law in interstate cases creates the potential for 
a different kind of conflict: a collision between the laws of sister states. As 
noted above, strict territorialism has been abandoned as the foundation of 
interstate conflicts analysis.38 Some commentators argue that this shift 
obviated the need for a presumption against extraterritoriality in the 
interstate context.39 On this view, rather than focus on legislative intent 
regarding scope, courts should simply ask whether the enacting state has an 
interest in applying the relevant law to the particular factual question. 
Constitutional limitations (specifically, the full faith and credit clause and 
the due process clause) would serve to restrain over-regulation, if necessary, 
but no general presumption against the extraterritorial application of state 
law would be required. 
In some cases, courts have in fact asserted that there is simply no 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of state law in a 
multistate conflict.40 However, a review of the case law in this area reveals a 
surprising durability of the presumption against extraterritorial application 
of state law (even in its most traditional incarnation). It also reveals a fair 
amount of confusion regarding the basis of the presumption, as well as a 
frequent failure to distinguish clearly between interstate and international 
conflicts.41 The following section lays out the rationales that courts employ 
when applying the presumption in multistate cases. 
 
guidance supplied by the Supreme Court. It would be incongruous if Congress, which clearly has the 
power to legislate extraterritorially, was more restricted in drafting such legislation than the New York 
legislature.”). 
 38.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 39.  Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 29, at 1230 (noting “[t]he state courts’ rejection of interpretive 
presumptions against extraterritoriality and their application of forum law”). 
 40.  See, e.g., Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 414 n.9 (Mass. 2013) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted): 
The presumption against the extraterritorial application of Federal statutes is grounded in the 
assumption that Congress would indicate expressly that a statute applies extraterritorially 
before intruding on the “delicate field of international relations.” Such concern is inapposite in 
the interstate context . . . Assuming without deciding that there is a presumption against the 
application of Massachusetts statutes outside the United States, . . . we conclude that there is 
no corresponding presumption against the application of Massachusetts statutes to conduct 
occurring outside Massachusetts but within the United States.  
See also Dow v. Casale, 989 N.E.2d 909, 913 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). 
 41.  See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 29, at 1224–25 (observing more generally that courts tend 
to treat extraterritoriality cases the same whether in the interstate or international context). 
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1. Traditional Territorialism 
As discussed above, the theory of territorial sovereignty upon which 
this traditional justification rests has been discarded. Some cases have 
recognized this theoretical shift, and its implications for the presumption.42 
However, many courts interpreting state law have failed to do so, and 
continue to apply the presumption on the grounds that a law has no force 
beyond the boundaries of the enacting state.43 Such courts frequently 
mention the age of these early decisions—predating the abandonment of 
strict territorialism—as proof of the longstanding and therefore, in their 
view, precedential nature of the presumption.44 
2. Avoiding Conflict with the Laws of Sister States 
Many of the decisions addressing the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of state law in interstate conflicts invoke the need 
to avoid conflicts with the laws of sister states. One representative opinion 
expressed this concern as follows: 
We begin our analysis with the well-established presumption against 
extraterritorial operation of statutes. That is, unless a contrary intent 
appears within the language of the statute, we presume that the statute is 
meant to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the 
Commonwealth . . . This rule of construction helps to protect against 
unintended clashes of the laws of the Commonwealth with the laws of our 
sister states. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de 
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547, 554–55 
(1963) . . . . 
 
 42.  See Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. 1968) (recognizing the 
argument that the move to “modern concepts and approaches” challenged the “inhibition against 
extraterritoriality,” but ultimately applying the presumption on the basis of stare decisis); see also Nelson 
v. Hall, 684 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (recounting the plaintiff’s argument that the 
presumption against extraterritorial effect “represents the now discredited vested rights direction,” and 
that the shift in choice of law theory to a “most significant relationship” test meant an acceptance of 
extraterritorial effect). 
 43.  See, e.g., Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., No.15-cv-02277-JST, 2016 WL 6576621, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 7, 2016) (citing a 1916 case, and quoting the statement that “the statutes of a state have no force 
beyond its boundaries” to support the proposition that “California law presumptively does not apply to 
conduct that takes place outside of California”); see also Anderson v. CRST Intern., Inc., 2015 WL 
1487074, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843, 854 (Mich. 1982) 
(“The general rule of law is ‘that no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or operate upon 
property or persons beyond its territorial jurisdiction’. However, as populations and technology 
progressed and travel between countries and among the states increased to an everyday occurrence, 
exceptions to the general rule of extraterritoriality were created so that it is now recognized that ‘a state 
may have the power to legislate concerning the rights and obligations of its citizens with regard to 
transactions occurring beyond its boundaries’.”(quoting 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 357)). 
 44.  See, e.g., Wright v. Adventure Rolling Cross Country, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104378, at 
*13 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) (“[T]he California Supreme Court has referred to the presumption against 
extraterritorial application as far back as 1916.”). 
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. . . . 
Imposing the policy choice by the Commonwealth on the employment 
practices of our sister states should be done with great prudence and 
caution out of respect for the sovereignty of other states, and to avoid 
running afoul of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.45 
This justification for a presumption against extraterritoriality is 
superficially similar to the international comity justification in the federal 
context, which also seeks to avoid unnecessary conflict with other 
sovereigns. Indeed, many of the cases interpreting state law—such as the one 
cited above—quote from decisions on the federal presumption against 
extraterritoriality to support their conclusions. They do so although the legal 
framework is quite different in the interstate context. It is constitutional 
concerns, not foreign relations concerns, that animate the presumption here. 
These concerns are twofold, as reflected in the passage quoted above. First, 
states legislate against the background of the dormant commerce clause. 
Second, states legislate in light of general principles of horizontal federalism, 
and the recognition that sister states have exclusive sovereignty over their 
own territories absent federal preemption. The following sections explore the 
role of these principles in supporting the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of state law in the interstate context.46 
a. Commerce Clause Concerns 
States retain the authority to regulate local matters even when that 
regulation affects interstate commerce to some degree; however, the 
Supreme Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence places certain 
limits on that authority.47 Courts generally presume that a state legislature 
would not intentionally enact a law that violated commerce clause limits; one 
way to apply this presumption is to assume that state law applies only within 
the territory of the enacting state unless otherwise indicated. The Fourth 
Circuit explained this justification for the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of state law in a case involving the South Carolina 
Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act: 
The principle that state laws may not generally operate extraterritorially is 
one of constitutional magnitude. One state may not “project its legislation” 
into another, as the Commerce Clause “precludes the application of a state 
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, 
 
 45.  Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188, 190, 193 (Ky. 2001); see also Judkins v. St. 
Joseph’s Coll. of Maine, 483 F. Supp. 2d 60, 65 (D. Me. 2007) (“This broad presumption guards against 
possible conflicts with other states’ laws and violations of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 46.  For a thorough exploration of these constitutional dimensions of the presumption, see Katherine 
Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in 
Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1082-92 (2009). 
 47.  See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335–36 (1989). 
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whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.” This rule 
reflects core principles of constitutional structure. It derives in part from 
the structure of federalism, which is built upon “the autonomy of the 
individual states within their respective spheres.” It also reflects “the 
Constitution’s special concern” with “the maintenance of a national 
economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate 
commerce” . . . South Carolina’s framework of statutory construction 
gives voice to these structural interests as surely as our constitutional 
framework, and by interpreting the Dealers Act in accordance with the 
state’s rule against extraterritorial applications, we avoid these 
constitutional harms.48 
In another representative case, the court cited the “doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance” in support of the proposition that courts will 
construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems “unless such construction 
is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”49 It concluded that a 
construction of state labor law to exclude its extraterritorial application 
“avoids the potential dormant commerce clause issues” that might arise from 
its application to work performed outside the enacting state.50 
b. General Federalism Concerns 
This concern underpins a comity-type restraint—the idea that one state 
would not lightly adopt a law affecting the interests of a sister state.51 Courts 
often refer to the need to “respect the interests of other states,” and view the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as a way to do so.52 Some explicitly 
analogize to international comity: 
[F]ederal courts have long recognized a presumption against 
extraterritorial application of federal legislation. This presumption reflects 
a standard of comity toward other countries by precluding undue 
interference with the laws of foreign countries when the conduct at issue 
occurs outside of the United States. The same consideration would seem 
to preclude us from extending the reach of the [Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act] to conduct that occurs in other states in the absence of clear 
legislative intent to the contrary.53 
 
 48.  Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc., 492 F.3d 484, 489–90 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
 49.  Sarviss v. General Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 2d 883, 901 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
(quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg., 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
 50.  Id.; see also IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 51.  For an argument that the presumption against extraterritorial application of state law “should 
be regarded as an inference from the structure of our system as a whole,” see the second essay in Donald 
H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1887 (1987). 
 52.  See, e.g., Westwind Acquisition Co. v. Univ. Weather & Aviation, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 749, 
752 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 53.  Taylor v. Rodale, Inc., 2004 WL 1196145, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citations omitted). 
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Nevertheless, courts sometimes borrow from analysis of 
extraterritoriality of federal legislation without acknowledging its grounding 
in concerns of foreign relations. In one case interpreting the reach of Texas 
antitrust law, the Texas Supreme Court began by stating “[a] principle of 
federalism is that ‘[n]o State can legislate except with reference to its own 
jurisdiction.’”54 It then asked whether the Texas legislature would have 
intended to give that law extraterritorial reach, and thus “supplant Arkansas, 
Louisiana, or Oklahoma law” on consumer protection.55 In one passage of 
its opinion, though, it turned to federal precedent, noting that the Supreme 
Court had construed the Sherman Act to reach foreign conduct only in cases 
where that conduct had effect within the United States. By applying a 
presumption against extraterritoriality to the Texas law, it concluded, it 
would construe the local law in a way that harmonized it with federal law.56 
3. Due Process 
Some courts have mentioned another constitutional explanation for the 
state-level presumption: that it protects the due process rights of individuals. 
In a recent family law dispute, a court considered whether a Utah law that 
foreclosed parental rights on the basis of certain conduct applied when the 
conduct in question occurred in another state:57 
By following the presumption [against extraterritoriality] in interpreting 
the statute, moreover, we also protect the legitimate expectations and 
reliance interests of those who are bound by its terms. A person in 
Nevares’s shoes could not reasonably have anticipated that section 111 
would foreclose his parental rights if a child conceived as a result of his 
sexual activity in Colorado were brought to Utah to be placed for adoption 
here. Had Nevares considered section 111, he would reasonably have 
understood it to apply only to sexual offenses with a jurisdictional 
connection to Utah. That conclusion, moreover, would doubtless have 
been informed by an intuitive sense of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, as even non-lawyers have a sense that criminality is the 
domain of the separate states, and that activity wholly in one state cannot 
properly be subject to criminal charges in another.58 
4. Focus on Domestic Conditions 
Finally, as in the case of the federal presumption, many courts have 
stated that legislatures act with domestic conditions in mind. As the Supreme 
 
 54.  Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmor Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. 2006). 
 55.  Id. at 681. 
 56.  This approach may overlook an important difference in the potential for substantive conflict: 
the variation in laws among U.S. states is significantly less than the variation between U.S. and foreign 
laws. 
 57.  Nevares v. M.L.S., 345 P.3d 719 (Utah 2015). 
 58.  Id. at 727; accord In re Adoption of J.M.S., 345 P.3d 709 (Utah 2015). 
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Court itself noted in one recent case, the idea is that “New York legislators 
make law with New York plaintiffs and defendants in mind, i.e., as if New 
York were the universe.”59 
* * * 
As the analysis above makes clear, courts considering interstate 
conflicts have frequently analogized to the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of federal law in international conflicts. That 
analogy may cause them to overlook critical differences in the legal 
frameworks within which the presumption operates. First, while the 
presumption protects comity interests in both interstate and international 
cases, it serves an additional function in international cases by protecting 
against unlawful legislative overreach. In interstate cases, this function is 
served by constitutional restraints, which place hard limits on the 
extraterritorial application of state law. Even if the intent of a state legislature 
to give its law extraterritorial effect is perfectly clear, that law will be 
invalidated if it violates the commerce clause.60 In other words, the 
presumption does not serve as the only barrier to an illegitimate assertion of 
legislative authority. The same is not true in international conflicts, as 
international law does not limit the extraterritorial application of federal 
legislation in the same manner. If Congress expressly intends to give a 
federal law extraterritorial effect, courts are bound to apply it accordingly, 
even if the result violates international law.61 As a result, the presumption 
plays an additional function in the international context. By requiring a clear 
expression of congressional intent, it reduces the likelihood of international 
law violations that would not otherwise be prevented. 
Second, at the federal level, the presumption operates as part of a purely 
unilateral form of conflicts analysis. A U.S. court will inquire whether the 
federal law (that is, local law) in question applies to the dispute. Under 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if the answer is “no,” the case will be 
dismissed, and if the answer is “yes,” the law will be applied.62 (For this 
 
 59.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 453 (2010) (offering 
this as the most likely explanation for the absence of explicit geographic limitations on a state law); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 3, § 6 cmt. c (“Legislatures usually 
legislate . . . only with the local situation in mind.”). 
 60.  Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 61.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 62.  There are two explanations for this approach. First, the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in 
some such cases is predicated on the existence of a federal question. If the statute does not apply, then no 
federal question is presented, and the case must be dismissed. See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 29, at 
1232. This does not explain all dismissals, however, as judicial jurisdiction in international disputes is 
often predicated on the basis of diversity. The second and more powerful explanation is the traditional 
“public law taboo”: U.S. courts will not apply foreign penal or regulatory law. 
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reason, it is important that courts observe reasonableness limitations in 
determining the reach of forum law, in order to minimize conflicts with 
foreign law.63) The court will neither inquire into the scope of potentially 
applicable foreign law nor engage in an analysis of priority.64 This kind of 
analysis, in other words, turns entirely on scope. Multistate conflicts, in 
contrast, are typically resolved through a multilateral (or at least mixed) form 
of analysis. In such conflicts, the court’s task is to consider multiple 
potentially applicable laws and ultimately to select one to resolve the case. 
On that approach, legislative intent regarding the scope of law is not 
necessarily determinative, as courts will have the opportunity to weigh the 
relative interests of states before applying their law to a particular transaction 
or event. 
II. THE APPLICATION OF GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS IN 
MULTISTATE CONTRACT DISPUTES 
The previous Part explored the draft Restatement Third’s definition of 
internal law, noting that it appears to include not only explicit but also 
implicit restrictions on a law’s scope. It then focused on one of the most 
important sources of implicit scope restrictions—the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. It suggested that courts often ignore important distinctions 
between international and interstate conflicts of law in applying the 
presumption, leading to its potential overuse in the multistate context. This 
Part seeks to explain why all this matters. What are the consequences of 
categorizing a scope restriction as part of a law’s substance rather than as a 
choice-of-law rule? I address that question through the lens of an issue that 
presents particularly clearly the interplay between scope and priority: the 
treatment of governing-law clauses in multistate contract disputes. 
Quite frequently, a contract dispute will involve a transaction or event 
that falls outside the scope of the law chosen by the parties to govern their 
agreement. Consider the following example: 
An employer headquartered in state A contracts with an employee, a 
resident of state B, to provide services in state B. The contract selects the 
law of state A to govern all issues or disputes arising out of the 
employment relationship. State A’s wage law includes a provision stating 
that it applies to wage disputes relating to work performed within state A. 
 
 63.  See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 15 § 204; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 61, § 403. 
 64.  While Section 403(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law invited courts to 
evaluate and balance the interests advanced in forum and foreign law, the Supreme Court has rejected 
that approach. 
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Let’s assume that the employee sues to recover unpaid wages. Whether the 
lawsuit were initiated in state A or in state B, one would expect the court to 
apply state A’s law, in accordance with the parties’ agreement. This is the 
consequence of a choice-of-law rule stating that (with some limitations) 
where the parties to a contract have chosen applicable law, that law governs 
their agreement.65  The question is how that rule interacts with the scope of 
the chosen law. Should the court give effect to the scope restriction66 in A’s 
law as part of the substance of that law, in which case the plaintiff’s claim 
would fail? Or should it apply the substantive provisions of A’s law 
exclusive of the scope restriction?67 A further question is how to handle 
implicit restrictions on scope. If a statute is silent as to its own geographic 
reach (and thus potentially subject to a presumption against extraterritorial 
application), can it be applied beyond the territory of the enacting state by 
operation of party agreement? 
The first section below discusses current practice regarding contracts 
disputes like these. It begins with the relevant provisions of the Restatement 
Second and then turns to case law, noting the emergence of competing 
approaches to the treatment of scope restrictions. The second section 
analyzes the potential impact of the draft Restatement’s definition of 
“internal law,” evaluating whether the resulting approach adequately 
accounts for certain conflicts values. 
A. Current Practice 
The Restatement Second uses the phrase “local law” rather than 
“internal law.” It defines a state’s local law as “the body of standards, 
principles and rules, exclusive of its rules of Conflict of Laws, which the 
courts of that state apply in the decision of controversies brought before 
them.”68 Unlike the draft Restatement Third’s definition of “internal law,” 
 
 65.  The relevant provision of the Restatement Second lays out two different tests. If the issue in 
question is one that the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in the contract, then the choice 
of a foreign law will be upheld. If the issue in question is one that the parties could not so have resolved, 
then it will be upheld unless (a) the chosen state has no relationship to the parties, or (2) application of 
the chosen law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the state whose law would apply in the 
absence of choice. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 187. 
 66.  It is important to highlight that characterizing a statute like the one described above as 
containing a “scope restriction” raises a threshold issue. A statute that “applies to wage disputes relating 
to work performed within state A” creates a local cause of action only for claims relating to work within 
A. But does such a statement indicate the intent of the legislature affirmatively to foreclose application 
of the law in multistate cases? We return to this point infra at Part II.B. 
 67.  Section 187(3) provides that in the absence of indication to the contrary, the law chosen by the 
parties is the “local law” of the state of the chosen law. It is the ambiguity in Section 4’s definition of 
“local law” that leaves these questions open. 
 68.  RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 4(1). 
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this definition does not explicitly classify limitations on scope either as part 
of “local law” or as a form of conflict-of-laws rule. I am aware of only one 
decision addressing this question directly, and it favored the former 
interpretation. In that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
whether the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act applied to dealers located 
outside the state of Illinois.69 The court determined that under the 
Restatement Second, geographic limitations were to be treated as part of the 
relevant law: “The Restatement excludes from ‘local law’ only the choice-
of-law rules of the state, not any territorial limitations contained in the statute 
. . . [If] Illinois law applies, then we must look to the law of Illinois to 
determine the scope of application.”70 
Other cases, while not directly addressing the black-letter definition of 
“local law,” describe geographic scope restrictions in ways that favor the 
latter interpretation. In another Seventh Circuit case, for example, the court 
stated that by limiting particular legislation to in-state dealers, the Wisconsin 
legislature had “announc[ed] a particular choice of law rule for dealership 
cases in duly enacted legislation.”71 Moreover, some of the comments and 
illustrations included elsewhere in the Restatement Second support the view 
that “local law” was intended to encompass only the rules that would apply 
in the enacting state to a purely domestic case, thus excluding geographic 
scope limitations.72 This characterization accords with the view of many 
conflicts scholars that geographic restrictions, even when contained in the 
text of a statute itself, are most accurately viewed as unilateral choice-of-law 
rules.73 
The Restatement Second also provides little guidance on how courts 
should treat scope limitations in cases of conflict. It directs them to observe 
the geographic restrictions included in a domestic statute, including implicit 
as well as explicit restrictions.74 But it does not address the treatment of 
scope restrictions in the laws of other states. 
 
 69.  Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc. v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 385 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 70.  Id. at 386. 
 71.  Generac Corp. v. Caterpillar Inc., 172 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 1999). However, the court went 
on to distinguish this kind of choice of law rule from “general” choice of law principles, and may have 
believed that only the latter were excluded from the definition of “local law.” 
 72.  See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 8 cmt. d. 
 73.  See SYMEON SYMEONIDES, CHOICE OF LAW 494 (2016). 
 74.  A comment to Section 6 provides in part that 
[t]he court should give a local statute the range of application intended by the legislature when 
these intentions can be ascertained and can constitutionally be given effect . . . Sometimes a 
statute’s intended range of application will be apparent on its face . . . When the statute is silent 
as to its range of application, the intentions of the legislature on the subject can sometimes be 
ascertained by a process of interpretation and construction. Provided that it is constitutional to 
do so, the court will apply a local statute in the manner intended by the legislature even when 
the local law of another state would be applicable under usual choice-of-law principles. 
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In applying domestic law, courts do routinely give effect to explicit 
scope restrictions included in that law. As a result, in contract disputes, they 
will decline to apply a domestic statute “to parties falling outside [the stated] 
limitations, even if the parties stipulate that the law should apply.”75 
Furthermore, and consistent with the Restatement Second’s guidance, they 
give effect to implicit scope restrictions in domestic statutes when they 
conclude such restrictions exist.76 That conclusion in turn generally rests on 
whether or not they apply the presumption against extraterritorial application 
of state law. One representative decision described the treatment of explicit 
scope restrictions, and then explained its extension of that treatment to 
implicit scope restrictions as follows: 
[T]here is no logical reason to reach a different result where that limitation 
is implicit, especially when the California Supreme Court has made clear 
that such limitations are presumed to be present unless the legislature’s 
contrary intention “is clearly expressed or reasonably to be inferred from 
the language of the act or from its purpose, subject matter or history.” 
Moreover, a contractual choice of law provision that incorporates 
California law presumably incorporates all of California law—including 
California’s presumption against extraterritorial application of its law.77 
Another decision giving effect to this form of implicit restriction 
foreshadows the draft Restatement Third’s conception of a two-step 
approach: 
But most importantly, by jumping straight to a conflict of laws analysis, 
the plaintiffs skip an important analytical step. A court conducts a conflict 
of laws analysis only where the laws of multiple states could conceivably 
apply to the same claim. Where only one state’s law applies, no such 
analysis is necessary. And as explained below, [due to application of a 
presumption against extraterritorial effect,] the California wage and hour 
laws asserted here simply do not apply to employees who work 
exclusively in another state.78 
If the presumption against extraterritoriality were not applied in such 
cases, there would be no reason to foreclose the application of the chosen 
law pursuant to the choice-of-law rule favoring party autonomy. A few 
courts have followed this reasoning in interpreting the reach of domestic law. 
In one recent case, a Massachusetts court considered a wage claim brought 
by an out-of-state employee under Massachusetts law, pursuant to a choice-
 
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 6 cmt. b. 
 75.  Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 76.  See, e.g., Wright v. Adventures Rolling Cross Country, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104378; 
Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Sawyer v. Market Am., Inc., 661 S.E.2d 
750, 754 (Ct. App. NC 2008). This approach is consistent with the guidance included in RESTATEMENT 
SECOND § 6 cmt. b; see supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 77.  O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989 (2014). 
 78.  Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1061. 
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of-law clause in his employment agreement.79 The relevant statute contained 
no express geographic restriction. Invoking the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the employer argued that the statute did not reach work 
performed outside of the state, and therefore could not be applied “regardless 
of choice-of-law principles.”80 The court disagreed. Noting the differences 
between interstate and international conflicts, it concluded there was no 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of Massachusetts law to 
conduct occurring elsewhere within the United States, and therefore no 
implicit limitation on the law’s reach.81 Absent an express limitation, it 
stated, a court should look “to all the relevant choice of law considerations.” 
That approach led it to apply the chosen law to the plaintiff’s claim.82 
As noted above, the Restatement Second does not instruct courts how 
to treat scope restrictions in foreign law. Unsurprisingly, practice on that 
point is far less uniform. Here, courts disagree even as to the treatment of 
express restrictions on scope. Some courts do consider such restrictions in 
foreign law to be binding.83 The Cromeens case discussed above84 illustrates 
this approach: 
[E]ach contract contained a choice-of-law clause specifying that the 
contracts would be construed and interpreted in accordance with the law 
of the State of Illinois. The IFDA is a provision of Illinois law but, by its 
own terms, the IFDA applies only to franchises located within the State of 
Illinois . . . If . . . Illinois law applies, then we must look to the law of 
Illinois to determine the scope of application.85 
Other courts, however, take a different approach. They characterize the 
matter not as effectuating the intent of a legislature regarding the application 
of its law, but as effectuating the intent of the contract parties to bind 
themselves to certain substantive provisions.86 Consider the following 
analysis: 
 
 79.  Taylor v. E. Connection Operating Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. 2013). 
 80.  Id. at 413. 
 81.  Id. at 414 n.9. 
 82.  Which had the effect, as the court noted, of holding the employer to the choice-of-law clause it 
had drafted. Id. at 411 n.8. 
 83.  See, e.g., Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc. v. E. Auto Distribs., Inc., 892 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc. v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 376 (7th Cir. 2003); Bimel-Walroth Co. 
v. Raytheon Co., 796 F.2d 840, 842-43 (6th Cir. 1986); Highway Equip. Co. v. Caterpillar Inc., 908 F.2d 
60 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 84.  See supra note 69. 
 85.  Cromeens, 349 F.3d at 384–86. The court was considering the relevant statute as a matter of 
foreign law, since the case had been transferred from a district court in Arkansas and therefore required 
application of Arkansas choice-of-law rules. Id. at 383. 
 86.  See, e.g., Hall v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 876 N.E.2d 1036, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“[T]he 
issue is not the territorial application of [another state’s consumer protection statute] but whether the 
parties chose to apply [that state’s] law to govern the validity of the provisions in their contract.”); accord 
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[Cases effectuating scope limitations despite contractual choice of law] 
treat the parties’ contractual choice of law as a legislative act rather than a 
contractual incorporation of “extrinsic material.” [They] consider the 
intent of the chosen laws’ state legislature dispositive—as if the parties’ 
choice somehow effects [sic] the chosen state’s interests. Choosing 
Illinois’ laws as a short-hand means of incorporating numerous 
contractual terms does not affect any interest of the State of Illinois. The 
parties are not availing themselves of the Illinois court system. Any issues 
resolved by our court “under the law of Illinois” has, of course, no binding 
effect on Illinois courts, nor does it effect [sic] the interests of Illinois 
residents. Finally, enforcing the parties’ choice of law does not in any way 
give “extraterritorial” effect to the laws of Illinois: the contract, not the 
law of Illinois, is enforced in Iowa.87 
On this view, the critical question is what the parties intended when 
they selected the law of a particular state to govern their contract. Focusing 
on the legitimate expectations of parties to multistate contracts, courts 
adopting this approach typically conclude that the law selected by parties to 
govern a contract includes only the operative provisions of that law, 
exclusive of any territorial restrictions.88 
B. Geographic Scope Restrictions Under the Restatement Third 
As the previous section reflects, current practice regarding the treatment 
of scope restrictions in multistate contract cases is divided. The Restatement 
Third, by explicitly defining such restrictions as part of “internal law,” 
appears to endorse the approach under which parties to a multistate contract 
would be unable to opt in to a substantive statutory regime that did not by its 
terms cover their eventual dispute. In my view, this outcome would sacrifice 
some of the conflicts values reflected in priority rules favoring party 
autonomy. Business relationships that cross territorial borders—whether 
interstate or international—present legal uncertainties that can be avoided 
through the use of governing-law clauses. Ordinarily, where such clauses are 
used, the expectation of the parties is that it is the substantive provisions of 
the selected law that will be applied.89 Furthermore, in certain types of 
 
Rabé v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2011) (an international case concluding that 
“an employer may agree by contract to extend statutory legal protections to an employee who might not 
be covered by the statute itself”). 
 87.  Infomax Office Sys., Inc. v. MBO Binder & Co. of Am., 976 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (S.D. Iowa 
1997). 
 88.  For an illustrative characterization of this issue, see Rabé, 636 F.3d at 868 (concluding that the 
contract “had the effect of applying the substantive provisions of United States and Illinois employment 
discrimination laws,” thus differentiating those provisions from scope provisions) (emphasis added). 
 89.  See, e.g., id. at 871–72 (describing the “serious complications and uncertainties” attending the 
employment status of an international flight attendant, and stating that “[t]he most reasonable 
interpretation of this employment agreement is that United [Airlines] agreed to application of the 
substance of United States [and Illinois] law notwithstanding provisions that would otherwise point 
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contract, there is an interest in ensuring that the more powerful party does 
not use a contract of adhesion to select a law that affords no remedy to the 
weaker party. For instance, several of the decisions discussed above 
expressed discomfort with the idea that an employer could bind an employee 
to a choice of law that did not cover the latter’s employment.90 
At the same time, it is not clear that this approach would meaningfully 
advance any competing choice-of-law values in multistate contract disputes. 
It is true that one such value is effectuating the state interests reflected in the 
particular laws at issue.91 Statutory law often contains some indication of a 
state’s interest in this regard; for instance, a provision extending a statute’s 
reach to certain forms of out-of-state conduct clearly articulates the enacting 
state’s interest in regulating that conduct. If courts in other states failed to 
apply the law in accordance with that mandate, the state interest would be 
adversely affected.92 It is far less clear, however, that provisions limiting a 
statute’s reach articulate any cogent interest in ensuring that the law confer 
rights and obligations exclusively in connection with in-state activity or 
persons. When a statute addresses itself only to in-state persons or activity 
(for example, in a law protecting automobile dealers that defines “dealer” to 
mean “a person who is a grantee of a dealership situated in this state”),93 the 
legislature may simply have been agnostic as to its application to other 
persons or activity.94 And in the case of implicit restrictions, a state’s interest 
 
against its coverage because of [plaintiff]’s status as an alien and the changing locations of her work”). It 
is an unsatisfactory alternative to this to require parties to spell out their rights and obligations 
individually. 
 90.  See, e.g., Taylor v. E. Connection Operating Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 411 n.8 (Mass. 2013). For 
an analysis of this dynamic in the context of franchise agreements, see George F. Carpinello, Testing the 
Limits of Choice of Law Clauses: Franchise Contracts as a Case Study, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 57, 59 (1990). 
Carpinello notes that standard-form franchise agreements often select the law of a state other than that in 
which the franchisee is located, thus depriving the franchisee of local protective legislation. Although the 
chosen law might include similar protection, if it is interpreted to lack extraterritorial effect, then the 
franchisee is left without recourse. Such situations might be addressed through an escape device of some 
kind, but that is an unsatisfactory fallback. Cf. Council Draft, supra note 5, § 5.03. 
 91.  See generally RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 6. 
 92.  See SYMEONIDES, supra note 1, at 372. 
 93.  See Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc. v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 386 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 94.  As Carlos Vázquez has argued, even when a statute does include a clear restriction on its scope 
(for instance, stating that it applies only to in-state persons or activity), it may be that such a restriction is 
motivated by a sense of comity—a willingness to yield to the different laws of other interested states. In 
this sense, he suggests, geographic scope restrictions are unlike substantive scope restrictions that limit a 
statute’s application to particular categories of persons or events: 
Geographic scope limitations . . . do not necessarily reflect a determination that the substantive 
rule is inappropriate for persons or situations that fall outside the law’s scope. [They] ordinarily 
reflect the state’s forbearance from applying the substantive rule to disputes that other states 
might have stronger claim to regulate. 
Carlos M. Vázquez, Choice of Law Step Zero 9 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 1, at 377 (describing such rules as “delineat[ing] the minimum spatial reach of 
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in preventing the application of its law in multistate cases may be entirely 
absent, given the questionable foundations of the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of state law in that context.95 
It is important to emphasize that the part of the draft Restatement Third 
containing specific priority rules governing conflicts of contract law has not 
yet been published. In my view, that part should include rules particular to 
multistate contract disputes that address the problem analyzed above. For 
instance, the successor to Section 187 of the current Restatement—a priority 
rule in favor of the law of the state chosen by the parties—could simply state 
that ordinarily, and consistent with legitimate expectations, the law to be 
applied is not the “internal law” of the state as defined in Section 1.03, but 
rather the substantive law of that state. Such an approach would negate the 
effect of Section 1.03 in this particular type of conflict.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has used choice of law in one particular area—contracts—
in order to assess the implications of the draft Restatement Third’s approach 
to questions of legislative scope. There are doubtless other areas of law in 
which the categorical treatment of legislative scope underpinning the two-
step principle may affect courts’ ability to balance particular conflicts values. 
For that reason, it might be preferable to await the drafting of the remainder 
of the new Restatement before committing to that treatment. In any event, 
and more generally, it would be helpful for the reporters (1) to distinguish 
explicitly between express and implicit limitations on geographic scope, and 
(2) to provide courts with guidance as to the foundation and parameters of 
any general presumption against extraterritorial application of state law. 
 
 
the statute that contains them, without pre-judging the more difficult question of defining its maximum 
reach”) (emphasis in original). 
 95.  See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 29, at 1230 (“Modern theory denies that state legislatures 
would prefer that their statutes be limited to local occurrences.”). 
